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Abstract
This paper presents a growth model in which property rights are insecure
and costly to enforce. Losses of property provide the impetus to establish
institutions which seek to enforce property rights. Institutions are shown to
implement policies that enforce property rights. The model establishes that
economies in which the institutional structure does not adequately protect property rights grow slowly, or not at all, while countries with better property rights
protection grow in accordance with the standard neoclassical model. Because
income inequality is a primary incentive to violate another's property rights,
the model also provides a positive theory of income redistribution. Empirical
tests of the model's predictions demonstrates that government expenditures
that enforce property rights raise per capita income growth.
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Introduction

Sustained economic growth requires continual technological innovation. Indeed, growth in the \new economy" is predicated upon the expansion of knowledge
which is transformed into productivity-enhancing goods (Romer, 1990; Amable, Breton & Ragot, 2002). Yet a substantial proportion of the world's economies exhibit
little or no growth. There are several mechanisms that produce such poverty traps
(Azariadis, 1997), though very little research has examined the institutional environment which inhibits or promotes growth-enhancing investment (exceptions are Zak
& Knack, 2001; and Knack & Keefer, 1997).
The recognition that institutions a®ect economic outcomes can be traced from
Adam Smith (1776/1937) through the theory by Haavelmo (1954) to the work of
Douglass North (1988, 1990). North argues that institutions which de¯ne and enforce
property rights a®ect economic performance because they reduce the transaction costs
and uncertainty which arise in exchange. As such, a theory of growth is incomplete
without a theory of institutions.1 The enforcement of property rights is even more
important in the new economy where \property" includes plans and ideas that are
easily expropriated.
This paper proposes a theory of growth in which property rights are insecure and
costly to enforce. Violations of property rights occur in the model unidirectionally
between two groups in society; those without accumulated resources expropriate from
those with such resources. This leads the latter to establish institutions designed to
protect property. Four primary results come out of the model: i) Insecure property
rights can cause countries to be caught in a poverty trap; ii) Countries with insecure
property rights that escape a poverty trap will have permanently lower levels of
per capita income as compared to countries with well-enforced property rights; iii)
Property rights violations lead to the endogenous formation of government institutions
to implement property protection policies; and iv) Developing countries with insecure
property rights may not be able to escape a poverty trap even when the government
allocates an optimal amount of resources to property rights protection. Empirical
tests of the model demonstrate strong support for these propositions.
The model here is related to the con°ict models of Herschel Grossman (1991,
1995), and Grossman & Kim (1995, 1996), in which economic agents have opportunities to gain resources via extra-legal means which occasions an institutional response.2
Grossman shows that a primary force driving property rights violations is an unequal
distribution of income. This suggests that one policy response may be income redis1 The

¯rst empirical tests of this thesis appear in Venieris & Gupta (1985, 1986); more recent
studies are Barro (1991), Alesina, Ozler, Roubini & Swagel (1996), Zak (2000a), and Ghate, Le &
Zak (2001).
2
Other related papers in this area include Skaperdas (1992), Konrad & Skaperdas (1998), Tornell
(1997), and Hirshleifer (1995, 1991).
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tribution (Grossman, 1995). Indeed, the present paper provides a positive theory of
income redistribution, and one that does not rely on the median voter theorem that
casual observation suggests is ill-suited to the political economy of many developing
countries.3 Both income redistribution and defensive measures are examined as policy responses to property rights violations. These policies are shown to raise welfare
of agents with accumulated wealth and stimulate output growth, but are unable to
insulate countries from being mired in a poverty trap.

2

Growth and Property Rights

The essential element that this model seeks to capture is the dynamics of gaining resources through production versus expropriation. Jack Hirshleifer (1991) has written
People can satisfy their desires in two main ways: by production or else
by con°ict.
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of agents who live two periods in
overlapping generations, with the mass of young workers normalized to unity. Workers
are born without assets and allocate their time between production and expropriating
accumulated resources from capital owners who are a generation older. Agents manage their capital holdings in the second period of life, consuming from their earnings.
There is no leisure in the model; workers allocate their time to production and/or
expropriative activities exclusively. Workers have access to an expropriation technology as in Hirshleifer (1991) and Grossman (1995), which is increasing in the time an
individual allocates to expropriation. 4
An increase in the time workers spend expropriating reduces the consumption of
capital owners in two ways. First and most directly, if the extra time devoted to
expropriation permits workers to procure capital, the consumption of capital owners
falls. Secondly, spending more time expropriating reduces the time in production,
reducing output and decreasing the return to capital.
Formally, an agent born at time t maximizes lifetime utility by choosing consumption and an allocation of labor hours between production and expropriation by
solving
M axc0t ;c1t+1;l t U(c0t ; c1t+1)
(1)
3

Alesina & Rodrik (1994), Alesina & Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996, 1992), Persson & Tabellini
(1994), Benhabib & Rustichini (1996) and Chang (1998).
4
I am focusing exclusively on economic rationale for expropriation. Clearly political and psychological reasons exist which may induce property rights violations, but these are outside the scope
of the model. See North (1988) for a discussion of cultural and behavioral motivations for property
rights violations.
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s.t.
~ t Kt ¡ st
c0t = wt lt + ¼t R
1
~ t+1 st (1 ¡ ¼t+1)
ct+1 = R
1=
et + lt ;
where U is continuous, strictly concave and increasing in both arguments, cit is the
consumption at time t of an individual who is either a worker, i = 0 or a capital
owner, i = 1, w is the wage rate, l is the time the individual spends working with
L denoting the equilibrium time spent in production where the total time one has
~ = 1 + r ¡±
available is normalized to unity, s is savings with the yield on savings is R
for interest rate r and depreciation rate on capital ± 2 [0; 1]. Capital, K, is broadly
de¯ned to include both physical and intellectual capital, as the latter is particularly
susceptible to expropriation because of its portability.
The function ¼t = ¼(et ) : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is the expropriation technology, through
which a portion of the return to capital is expropriated by workers, with e t the time
spent expropriating. That is, expropriation is an illegal transfer of resource from
capital owners to workers. In the second period of life, agents are subject to the
expropriation of their resources by the current cohort of workers. By assumption,
individual e®ort applied to expropriation yields a weakly positive return, @¼
¸ 0.
@e
Since time is spent either working or expropriating, if the labor supplied to production
is increasing in the wage, higher wages raise the opportunity cost of time away from
production. This reveals the feedback between aggregate economic conditions and
the incentives to transgress others rights to property.
Capital owners run ¯rms and maximize pro¯ts by choosing the amount of capital
and labor to use in production. The ¯rm's optimization problem does not directly
depend on the security of property rights as expropriation occurs after production
decisions are made. Let F (K; L) be a neoclassical production function which is increasing and concave in both arguments and satis¯es the Inada conditions. Input
markets are assumed competitive so that pro¯t maximization results in input prices
equal to their marginal products, rt = F1(Kt ; Lt ), and wt = F2(Kt ; Lt ). Using the
factor prices above, the capital market clearing condition is given by
Kt+1 = S(Yt; Rt+1 );
~t Kt , the e®ective interest factor Rt+1 ´ R~t+1(1¡¼t+1) =
where income Yt ´ wt Lt +¼t R
(F1(K t+1 ; Lt+1 ) + 1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ¼t+1), and the savings function S(Y; R) is the optimal
solution to the agent's optimization problem (1).
~
Although an increase in the income of workers by the amount expropriated, ¼RK,
stimulates savings, expropriation also reduces the e®ective return to savings, R~t+1(1¡
¼t+1). Thus, a priori the impact of property rights violations on growth is ambiguous,
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depending on the relative sizes of the income and substitution e®ects. The following
result formalizes this notion.
Theorem 1 Suppose that fc0; c1g are normal goods and strict gross substitutes in
the model given by (1) and that labor hours in production are strictly increasing in
the wage. Then property rights violations lead to a lower level of steady state wealth
relative to the standard model in which property rights are perfectly and costlessly
enforced if the return from expropriation is not too large,
~ 0(K ) ¡¼ 0 (K)
R
~ ) > ¼(K)
R(K
and
~ 0 (K)K + ¼(K )R(K)
~
w 0 (K)(L(K) ¡ 1) + w(K)L0 (K) + ¼ 0 (K)R~0 (K)K + ¼(K)R
SR(Y; R)
>
>0
~ ) + ¼(K)R
~ 0 (K)
SY (Y; R)
¼0 (K)R(K
Proof See appendix.
[Figure 1 about here]
This theorem obtains when savings is su±ciently sensitive to the return R relative
to income Y . It speci¯es the conditions under which violations of property rights have
a deleterious e®ect on an economy with a unique interior steady state, as depicted
in Figure 1. Intuitively, the result shows that savings diminish because the e®ective
~
interest factor R(1¡¼)
falls due to property rights violations. Note that the extra-legal
transfer to workers does not produce a model which grows without bound as occurs
in some models with redistribution (Jones & Manuelli, 1991; Caball¶e & Manresa,
1994). A steady state is reached in the model here because the amount expropriated
declines with growth as the primary incentive to expropriate, a low wage, rises as
capital accumulates.5 It is straightforward to show that the distribution of income
narrows with growth if the labor supplied to the production sector is increasing in
the wage. This secondary e®ect of growth{a narrowing of the distribution of income{
further weakens the incentive to expropriate as per capita income rises.6
Theorem 1 does not consider the case in which the amount of expropriation is
so great that a positive rate of growth can not be sustained. Theorem 2 shows that
when the expropriation technology is e®ective at procuring resources and savings are
su±ciently sensitive to the net interest rate, the model with imperfect property rights
protection generate multiple stationary equilibria.
5

Endogenous perfect property rights protection obtains in this model as K ! 1, but this is not
observed since the steady state value of K is ¯nite.
6 The model's prediction that the distribution of income narrows with su±cient growth is consistent with most empirical evidence. See Brenner, Kaelble & Thomas (1991).
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Theorem 2 Let the optimal savings function be s(Y; R) where Y is net income and
R is net return to savings. Then, there are at least two nontrivial stationary equilibria
for the economy in which the agent solves (1) if
i) The labor supply is increasing in the wage,
ii) 9 a small positive level of capital K@ such that ¼(e(K@ )) = 1, and
iii)
R(K) < ¡K[¡¼ 0(K )R(K) + R0(K )];
iv) and 9 K t+1 > Kt .
Proof See appendix.

The proof of Theorem 2 above relies heavily on the geometry of the dynamical
system as depicted in Figure 2. The novelty of this result is the second condition
which obtains if the expropriation technology is so e®ective that at some low level of
capital workers optimally choose to allocate almost all of their time to expropriation.7
Theorem 2 suggests that poor economies (that is, K0 < KL in Figure 2) with
e®ective expropriation technologies may become mired in poverty traps. Wealthier
economies, even with e®ective expropriation technologies, have the advantage of a
higher wage rate which discourages expropriative activity. In this case, workers see
themselves much more as \part of the system" which keeps property rights violations
low. Growth reinforces the incentives to countenance property rights as wages rise
and the distribution of income narrows.
[Figure 2 about here]
Since expropriation is e®ectively a transfer from capital owners to workers, property rights violations unambiguously decrease the consumption the former. Owners of
capital, therefore, would be willing to fund institutions which protect property rights
if this would raise their utility. This issue is addressed by introducing a government.

3

Institutions

Because capital owners have an interest in property rights protection, they are the
only group of agents who would be willing to pay to form institutions to enforce
property rights. Indeed, the enforcement of property rights is a profound incentive
for the endogenous establishment of institutions. Because of this incentive we examine
7

This result is similar to the appearance of a poverty trap when the the elasticity of substitution
in production is su±ciently high so that at low levels of capital, savings is decreasing in the interest
factor (Galor & Ryder, 1989; Azariadis, 1997).
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the role that an institution, which we will call the government, has on the economy's
growth trajectory. Further, because this institution is formed by a subset of the
population, by assumption it is ¯nanced by taxing only members of its own group to
fund policies, i.e. it cannot impose a tax on workers.8 Thus, government policy is
undertaken at the behest of those with wealth. Nevertheless, policy choices are not
unconstrained since workers' responses to policies must be considered and policies
are costly to implement. Note that maximizing the return to capital is equivalent to
maximizing the economy's growth rate so that the policies considered here would also
be chosen by policy-makers seeking to maximize aggregate income growth.
Two policies are examined which seek to reduce expropriative activity: i) subsidies
to workers for the time spent in production and ii) police protection of assets. The
former raises the opportunity cost of expropriation which reduces property rights violations, while the latter does this by decreasing the return to expropriation. Because
policies are funded by a tax on capital, there is an indirect e®ect on expropriative
activity as the income di®erential between workers and owners of capital is reduced
by the tax, diminishing the relative payo® to expropriation.
Government policy is de¯ned to be a triple P = f¾; M; °g, which is a set of
employment subsidies, ¾, and security expenditures, M , both of which are funded by
a capital tax, °. In this case, an agent born at time t solves
M axc0t ;c1t+1;l t U(c0t ; c1t+1)

(2)

s.t.
c0t = (wt + ¾t )lt + ¼tR~t Kt (1 ¡ °t ) ¡ st
c1t+1 =
R~t+1s t(1 ¡ °t+1)(1 ¡ ¼t+1);
taking as given the expropriation technology, ¼t = ¼(e t; Mt ) : [0; 1] £ R+ ! [0; 1]
which now depends on expropriation e®ort e and security expenditures M . Optimal
decisions at time t are given by a savings function, s? (Kt ; Kt+1; Pt ; Pt+1) and a labor
allocation rule, L?(K t; P t). The government maximizes capital owners' consumption
by keeping labor supply in the production sector high and by protecting property
rights. Observe that the distribution of income now depends on tax and subsidy
rates as well as the level of capital, all of which evolve as the economy grows.
The following timing convention is adopted. The government, knowing the equilibrium labor supply function L? , chooses the optimal values for policies, P , collects
tax revenue and implements policies. Workers observe the resulting policies and then
8

A reduction in the income of workers via a tax would generally raise property rights violations
so this case is not considered here. In a related model, Zak (1994) shows that when a wage tax is
the only source of revenue used to fund a police force, the optimal tax rate is near 100% and workers
allocate almost all their time to production. More general results are contained in Zak (2000b).
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execute their consumption and labor allocation choices as the period begins. Production and expropriation occur during a period. Thus, the government and workers
play a Stackelberg game with the government moving ¯rst.
The government's optimization problem at time t is
M axPt

c1t

(3)

s.t.
°t RtK t = ¾tLt + Mt
Lt = L?(Kt ; Pt ):

(4)
(5)

The government chooses policies to maximize the consumption of capital owners,
which is the after-tax after-expropriation return to capital. The government's optimization is subject to two constraints: The budget equation (4) equating tax revenue
to government expenditures on policies ¾ and M , and the equilibrium labor supply
function (5).
The solutions to the model which includes government institutions is a perfect
Nash equilibrium which satis¯es the following conditions.
Definition A political-economic equilibrium is a sequence of prices fw t; Rt+1g1
t=0,
1
1
1
savings decisions fs t gt=1 , labor allocations fLtgt=1 , government policies fPt gt=1 and
a law of motion for capital, Kt+1 = ¡(Kt ) with K0 given such that, given an expropriation technology ¼: ¯rms choose inputs to maximize pro¯ts, policies P (Kt ) solve the
government's optimization problem (3), and the decision rules s(Kt ; Kt+1; Pt ; Pt+1),
L(K t ; Pt) solve the agents' lifetime utility maximization problem (2); and the capital
market clears
s(Kt ; Kt+1; Pt ; Pt+1) = K t+1:
Next we examine the dynamics of an economy with imperfect property rights
protection when the government implements policies f¾; M; °g. Under conditions
analogous to those in Theorem 1, it can be shown that the return to investment is
higher with government policies than without (otherwise capital owners would not
fund these policies). As a result, institutions that protect property rights raise the
level of steady state income. Figure 3 illustrates this.
[Figure 3 about here]
A more pressing question is whether government policy rules out the possibility
of a poverty trap. The following theorem shows that it does not.
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Theorem 3 There are at least two nontrivial stationary political-economic equilibria
for the economy in which the agent's problem is given by (2) and the government
solves (3) if
i) The labor supply is increasing in the wage,
ii) 9 a small positive level of capital K@ such that ¼(e(K@ )) = 1,
iii) as Kt ! K@ ,
R(K)[1 ¡ ° + ¼0 (K )(1 ¡ °(K)) ¡ K°(K )] < ¡R0(K)K(1 ¡ °(K)) ¡ ¾(K )L0 (K );
and
iv) 9 Kt+1 > Kt .
Proof See appendix.
This result shows that low wealth countries may be unable to escape a poverty trap
even when the government optimally implements policies to reduce property rights
violations. The intuition for the theorem is straightforward: When the incentives to
expropriate are greatest (low values of K), tax revenue available to fund policies is
low and therefore the property rights are poorly enforced. As the economy grows,
the interests of workers and capital owners evolves from adversarial to congruent
as wages and the labor supplied to production rise. With higher wages, workers
countenance property rights as it is in their interest to do so. Moreover, since growth
raises tax revenue over a range of the capital stock, policies ¾(K ), and M(K) receive
increased funding, enhancing the enforcement of property rights and therefore further
diminishing violations.
Even if the expropriation technology is insu±ciently productive to cause a poverty
trap, high rates of expropriation typically reduce steady state income relative to the
perfect property rights protection case. In addition, if a nontrivial amount of resources
are allocated to police protection of property, all equilibria are Pareto ine±cient as
police protection constitutes a deadweight loss to society.
Since most government policies are far from optimal, the imperfect enforcement of
property rights may be one reason that we observe what appear to be poverty traps
in many developing countries. Furthermore, the existence of a growth threshold
indicates that small di®erences in initial conditions lead to signi¯cant di®erences in
long-run outcomes. That is, countries which are initially similar may have much
di®erent economic histories if property rights protection di®ers.

4

Empirics

Empirical tests of the model are of two types. The ¯rst set of tests is based on the
optimal government policy functions for police protection and employment subsidies
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from parameterized versions of the model. This is meant as a \reality check" of
the model, rather than a full explanation of government spending patterns which
is beyond the scope of the paper. Nevertheless, if estimated policy functions are
consistent with the model's predictions, we can not dismiss the model out of hand.
The second empirical test estimates cross-country growth regressions in which police
expenditures and worker subsidies are used as explanatory variables.
Appendix A presents parameterized versions of the model in Section 3 from which
closed-form optimal government policy functions are found. For reasons of tractability, the model is specialized to consider each policy to reduce expropriation { employment subsidies and police expenditures { in isolation of the other. The derived
optimal policy functions specify and relationship between government expenditures
on subsidies and the police as a function of the state variable, the capital stock K.
Further, because of the use of Cobb-Douglas functional forms in the derivations, both
optimal policy functions are log linear in capital and therefore directly estimable.
The derived policy functions are estimated for a panel of countries using annual
data from 1970 to 1994. The data are from Government Finance Statistics (GFS)
collected by the International Monetary Fund (1998) and cover 67 countries beginning in 1970. \Public order and safety" is used to measure police expenditures, and
\transfers" proxy employment subsidies. The capital stock values are obtained from
the Penn World Tables Mark 5.6a (PWT), as described in Summers & Heston (1991).
As the capital series is less complete and subject to greater measurement error than is
income, an additional set of estimates for the policy functions is obtained using GDP
rather than capital as the regressor.9 A ¯xed-e®ects model is employed to control for
di®erent levels of capital stock across countries at the time of the initial observation.
All observations are converted to real (1982) \international dollars" per worker using
the price series from the PWT. The countries with available data that are used in the
statistical analysis are listed in Appendix B.
Estimating the optimal policy functions for subsidies and police spending demonstrates strong support for the model, with both t-statistics for the coe±cient of the
log of capital per worker being signi¯cantly di®erent than zero at greater than a 1%
level. A second test that includes a larger set of countries estimated both policy
functions using log of per-worker GDP as the regressor. Again both coe±cients are
signi¯cantly di®erent than zero at greater than a 1% level. 10
The estimation results for both police expenditures and employment subsidies
demonstrate support for the model. These empirics should be viewed with some
skepticism, though, as there are many reasons why government expenditures increase
9

Using income will change the value, but not the predicted sign, of the estimated coe±cient.
These regression results are not presented to conserve space, but are available upon request.
Reported t-statistics are based on standard errors that are corrected for both heteroskedasticity
using White's method and ¯rst-order serial correlation.
10
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with national income. For example, we have not considered political goals which may
lead policy-makers to increase government spending irrespective of considerations of
economic e±ciency.11 Nevertheless, the empirical results for an extensive range of
countries over a 24 year interval do not permit a rejection of the theory.

4.1

Growth Regressions

A second test of the model estimates standard growth regressions in which the savings
rate is assumed constant and the (log of) public safety expenditures and transfers
enter as explanatory variables. This analysis tests Barro's (1991) conjecture that
countries which have well-enforced property rights will have higher per capita growth
rates. The theory in this paper shows that expenditures on both public safety and
transfers reduce property rights violations. Since both variables are endogenous,
growth rate regressions are estimated using average expenditures for the period of
study, 1970-1990, for a cross section of developing and developed countries. Growth
regressions are estimated separately for public safety and transfers since the model
predicts that these variables are highly collinear.
Table 1 reports the regression coe±cients and t-statistics when per worker growth
rates are regressed on the log of GDP per worker in 1970 and either log of transfers
or log of public safety per worker. The estimated coe±cient for transfers is positive
as predicted by the theory and signi¯cantly di®erent than zero at the 5% level.12
The regression with public safety does not perform as well. The coe±cient on public
safety is positive but not di®erent from zero at conventional levels of signi¯cance. This
suggests that the theory may be incomplete. In particular, we have not considered
the behavior of governments which are weak and in danger collapsing. Such a regime
may spend resources at a rate beyond the optimal level required to protect property
rights in order to buttress itself against defenestration (Feng & Zak, 1999; Bueno
de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson & Smith, 2000). To test this hypothesis, a measure
of socio-political stability (SPI) is added to control for socio-political environments
which might induce high public safety expenditures.
The third regression in Table 1 augments the speci¯cation in regression 2 to include the (log of) average SPI times average public safety as a regressor.13 Including
both public safety and the interaction term in the regression captures reasons why
governments expend resources maintaining public order. The coe±cient on the interaction term is negative and signi¯cant while the coe±cient of average public safety
11 On

the propensity of politicians to increase ¯scal expenditures, see Ghate & Zak (2001) and the
survey in Holsey & Borcherding (1996).
12

Reported standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's method.
The SPI index is from Venieris & Gupta (1986) and is constructed using factor analysis on the
basis of ten social and political indicators, including political demonstrations, assassinations and the
number of coups d' ¶
etat.
13
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expenditures is now positive and signi¯cant at the 5% level.
[Table 1 about here]
The empirical tests of the theory indicate that property rights enforcement is an
important institutional precursor for growth. This result also decomposes Barro's
(1990) ¯nding that government consumption has a negative impact on growth by
examining the impact of speci¯c government programs. Policies which dispose citizens
to uphold property rights are growth-promoting, and growth permits countries to
better protect property rights.

Conclusion

5

This paper has presented a growth model in which property rights are insecure and
costly to enforce. The model demonstrates that the imperfect enforcement of property
rights may be part of the etiology of growth failures, and leads to the endogenous
formation of institutions. The model demonstrates that developing countries with
insecure property rights risk being caught in a poverty trap, even when government
policy to enforce property rights is optimal. For countries able to avoid a poverty
trap, the model also shows that long-run income will generally be lower the less secure
are property rights. Estimation of optimal policy functions derived from the model as
well as growth equations using a large set of countries demonstrate that the empirics
support the theory.
The model's results stand in stark contrast vis-µa-vis a-institutional growth models.
Indeed, capital in the model was broadly de¯ned to include intellectual property for
which expropriation may be especially easy. The model here suggests that incomes are
being reduced in countries with weak institutional structures even if such countries
utilize information technologies to spur income growth (e.g. India). Conversely,
countries with secure property rights (e.g. Singapore) will reap the bene¯ts of the
new economy through sustained innovation and income growth. Observation suggests,
and the model demonstrates, that without an institutional environment which can
o®er su±cient protection of property rights, growth will be mediocre at best.

A

Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1
Let S(Y; R) denote the savings function where savings depends on income Y and
the e®ective yield on savings, R. When property rights are perfectly and costlessly
protected, ¼ = 0 and L = 1 since there is no utility to leisure so that income Y = w
~ The assumptions on preferences guarantee that the savings function is
and R = R.
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strictly increasing in both arguments and concave, producing a single interior stationary equilibrium.
The theorem is proved by showing that the equilibrium path when property rights
are perfectly enforced is everywhere above the equilibrium path when expropriation
is permitted. Let K E denote the steady state in the model with expropriation. Using
the monotonicity property, the theorem holds for any level of capital 0 < K < 1,
which we choose to set to K E . Beginning with the second condition in the theorem,
and applying the ¯rst indicates that
~ 0 (K)K + ¼(K)R
~ 0 (K)K + ¼(K )R(K)]
~
SY [w 0 (K)(L(K) ¡ 1) + w(K)L0 (K) + ¼ 0 (K)R
~ ) + ¼(K)R~0 (K)]
= SR[¼0 (K)R(K

which is

~ R(1
~ ¡ ¼)]
~
dS[wL + ¼RK;
dS[w; R]
>
dK
dK jK =K E
jK=KE
where the second term is the savings function for the model with no expropriation
~ t+1 )
(et = 0, 8t) and in this savings function, next period's capital stock in the R(K
~ E ). Under this approximation, the inequality above implies
is approximated by R(K
that next period's capital stock for the model without expropriation, K N , exceeds
the value with there is expropriation,
KN > KE
which holds since S(Y; R) is strictly concave.
Proof of Theorem 2
First, we show that with an e®ective expropriation technology the slope of the excess
demand correspondence is less than unity at the origin. The savings correspondence
s(Y; R) has two arguments, income, Y , and the net return, R. Writing out these
terms explicitly and noting that in equilibrium excess demand in the capital market
must disappear we have
Kt+1 = S[w(Kt )L(K t) + ¼(Kt )R(K t)K t; R(¡(K t))(1 ¡ ¼(¡(Kt ))];
where the law of motion Kt+1 = ¡(Kt ) can always be found locally. Then,
dKt+1
~ 0(K)K + ¼(K )R
~ 0 (K)K + ¼(K )R(K)]
~
= SY [w 0 (K)L(K) + w(K )L0 (K )+ ¼0 (K )R
dKt
~ 0 (¡(K)) ¡ ¼0 (¡(K))R¡((K
~
+SR¡0 (K)[(1 ¡ ¼(¡(K )))R
))]

Taking the limit as Kt ! K @+, ¼(K ) ! 1 and L(K ) ! 0 and all derivatives of the
production function are bounded,
lim +

Kt !K@

dKt+1
= SY [w(K )L0 (K) + ¼0 (K)R~0 (K )K] ¡ SR¡0(K )¼0 ¡((K)):
dKt
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dKt

dKt+1
dKt
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< 0, which guarantees that

limKt!K@+
< 1 and phase curve begins below the 45± ray in Kt ¡ K t+1 space.
Thus, there is a poverty trap at the origin.
For at least one nontrivial stationary equilibrium to exist, the there must be some
value of K t such that K t+1 > Kt . Given the standard assumptions on preferences
and the production function,
dKt+1
lim
= 0;
(A.1)
Kt !1 dKt
Therefore, the phase curve begins below the diagonal, ends below the diagonal and
exceeds the diagonal for some value of K. Therefore, by continuity there are at least
two interior ¯xed points of the system.
Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of this theorem follows that of Theorem 2 above, so we simply sketch the
di®erences. First, note that ¼(K; M ) = ¼(K) after the government solves its optimization problem for M (K) and ¾(K). The conditions in the theorem are su±cient
to guarantee that
dK t+1
lim +
< 1;
Kt!K@ dK t
which is su±cient to prove that a poverty trap exists for the model with institutions.
Next I describe the setup of the model that produces the optimal policy functions
that were estimated in Section 4. For both cases, the utility and production functions
are U(c0; c1) = (1 ¡ ¯) ln(c0 ) + ¯ ln(c1 ), and F (K; L) = K ® L1¡® , for ®, ¯ 2 (0; 1).
The ¯rst case considered is a variant of the model of Section 3 where the government
maximizes the consumption of capital owners by choosing a capital tax, °, to fund
police expenditures, M , subject to the government budget constraint. In this model,
the expropriation technology is ¼ = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ e)µ M ¡´ , for µ; ´ 2 (0; 1). Here µ is the
productivity of e®ort applied to expropriative activities and ´ is the e®ectiveness of
police spending at reducing the rate of expropriation. The optimal policy function
is found by ¯rst solving the agent's problem for the labor supply function which is
taken as a constraint in the Stackelberg problem solved by the government.
Optimal expenditures on police protection can be shown to be increasing in capital, over some range, (0; KM ) and decreasing thereafter. As the country with the most
capital per worker in 1992, Switzerland, has not decreased public safety expenditures,
nor have any of the other capital-rich countries in the sample, in estimating optimal
policy functions it is assumed that all countries are below KM . Taking logs produces
the police expenditure equation generates the testable equation ln M = ³ + ¹ ln K,
where ³; ¹ > 0 are agglomerations of the deep parameters in the model.
In the second version of the model, a capital tax is used to fund an employment
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subsidy ¾ in order to reduce expropriation. The following expropriation technology
is available to workers ¼ = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ e)µ , with µ 2 (0; 1). This is the same functional
form used above when M ´ 1.
In order to generate a nonconstant level of expropriation and to capture the deadweight loss inherent in administering a subsidy program, a friction is added to the
model which is proportional to the level of employment L. 14 In this case, the government budget constraint is °RK = ¾L + AL¤, where the administrative cost, A > 0
and ¤ 2 (0; 1).
The same procedure discussed above is used to solve for the optimal policy function, though a closed form cannot be found except in the special case in which
µ = ¤ ¡ 1 + ® > 0. In this case, the optimal employment subsidy is increasing
over a range of the capital stock, (0; K¾ ), after which it decreases, matching the behavior of police expenditures. As with police expenditures, the optimal subsidy is
also log linear in capital.

B

Data

The countries for which there are either transfers (denoted with t) or public safety
(denoted with p) in the GFS dataset are listed below. All available data were used
in the reported regressions.
Botswana (tp), Cameroon (tp), Egypt (tp), Gambia (tp), Guinea Bissau (tp),
Kenya (tp), Lesotho (tp), Malawi (tp), Mauritius (tp), Morocco (tp), Nigeria (tp),
Seychelles (tp), Swaziland (tp), Togo (t), Tunisia (tp), Zambia (tp), Barbados (tp),
Canada (tp), Costa Rica (tp), Dominican Republic (t), El Salvador (tp), Guatemala
(t), Mexico (tp), Panama (tp), United States (tp), Argentina (tp), Bolivia (tp), Brazil
(tp), Chile (tp), Colombia (tp), Ecuador (p), Paraguay (tp), Peru (tp), Uruguay (tp),
Venezuela (tp), India (t), Indonesia (tp), Israel (tp), Jordan (tp), South Korea (tp),
Malaysia (tp), Pakistan (tp), Philippines (tp), Singapore (tp), Sri Lanka (tp), Thailand (tp), Austria (tp), Belgium (tp), Cyprus (tp), Denmark (tp), Finland (tp),
France (tp), Germany (tp), Greece (tp), Iceland (tp), Ireland (tp), Italy (t), Luxembourg (tp), Malta (tp), Netherlands (tp), Norway (tp), Portugal (t), Spain (tp),
Sweden (tp), Switzerland (tp), United Kingdom (tp), Australia (tp).

14 The friction can further be justi¯ed by noting that the cost to collect tax revenue in the US
has increased more than proportionally relative to the population. Source: Annual Report of the
Internal Revenue Service, various years.
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Figure 1: Path A: An economy with perfectly secure property rights; Path B:
An economy with insecure property rights.
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Figure 2: A time path of an economy with an effective expropriation
technology.
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Figure 3: A time path of an economy with and without institutions.

Dependent variable: Ln(∆GDP)
Regression 1:
Variable
Coefficient
Constant
Ln(GDP70)
Ln(Transfers)
Adjusted R2
Observations

.078
-.009
.004
.034
61

Regression 2:
Variable
Coefficient
Constant
Ln(GDP70)
Ln(PubSafty)
Adjusted R2
Observations

.053
-.005
.002
.033
50

Regression 3:
Coefficient
Variable
Constant
Ln(GDP70)
Ln(PubSafty)
Ln(PSaf*SPI)
Adjusted R2
Observations

.078
-.008
.004
-.002
.130
50

t-Statistic
2.77
-2.12
1.98

t-Statistic
2.13
-1.64
1.30

t-Statistic
2.77
-2.35
2.21
-2.73

Table 3: Growth regressions.

